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of the St. Louis Court of Appeals has begun the presentation of
the course in Missouri Law with several highly practical and in-
structive lectures on Missouri appellate practice.
The work in the Practice Court has been greatly expanded
under the direction of Dean McClain, with the purpose in mind
of affording training in the practical application of the law.
Pleading, impanelling of jurors, examination of witnesses, argu-
ments, and the other incidents of trial practice have been in-
cluded in the agenda. The Practice Court is fortunate in having
as its presiding justice, Judge John W. Calhoun, widely known
for his long and efficient service in the Circuit Court in St. Louis.
A Committee of the Faculty has been appointed to make a
thoroughgoing survey of the curriculum of the School of Law.
Important among the problems to be considered are the elimina-
tion of duplication in course work, the encouragement of a closer
relationship between students and members of the bar, the in-
troduction of new courses of modern importance, and similar
problems of fundamental importance in legal education. A pro-
gram of outside reading in materials of scientific and cultural
importance in the law is being developed. Also under consider-
ation is the advisability of offering graduate work leading to the
LL.M. degree to students who have shown exceptional promise in
the work for the LL.B.
Extensive improvements have been made in January Hall.
Tile-Tex flooring has been laid in all corridors and in the class-
rooms. Extensive expansion in library facilities has been com-
pleted. The Law Alumni Association is sponsoring a drive to
raise funds for the construction of a students' lounge and smok-
ing room.
NOTES
THE INQUISITORIAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
The National Labor Relations Act1 constitutes the latest step
in legislative intervention in the field of industrial relations. The
Act, intended to safeguard the privilege of American workers
to organize and select representatives for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining,2 goes beyond the mere general assertion of
1. 49 Stat. 457, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 151 (1935). This Act is popularly
known as the "Wagner Act."
2. Madden, The New Labor Relations Board (1935) 25 Amer. Labor
Leg. Rev. 179.
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workers' rights. It adds specific prohibitions of certain employ-
ers' activities deemed incompatible with genuine freedom for
workers to organize and bargain collectively, which are branded
"unfair labor practices,"' 3 and provides administrative machin-
ery for the attainment of its objective. 4 It is against those pro-
visions which concern themselves with the machinery of enforce-
ment that much of the opposition to the Act will be directed.,
This note will consider solely the constitutional limitations
upon the investigatory power of the National Labor Relations
Board, established by the Act.6 For the purposes of the present
discussion it will be assumed that the Act as a whole is valid ;7
3. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 8. The first prohibition of an unfair
labor practice forbids an employer from interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in their right to organize, bargain collectively through
self-chosen representatives, and engage in other concerted activities. The
second outlawed practice is that of dominating the administration of a labor
organization-or, in other words, maintaining a "company union." The third
bears upon the problem of the closed shop. The employer is forbidden to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization by discrimina-
tion in hiring or in respect to tenure or other terms of employment; but the
Act permits closed-shop agreements with labor unions. The fourth unfair
labor practice is that of discharging one who has filed charges or given testi-
mony under the Act. The fifth provision makes it unlawful to refuse to bar-
gain collectively with the representatives of employees. For a general dis-
cussion see Starr, National Labor Relations Act (1936) 10 St. John's L.
Rev. 358.
5. McCabe, Recent Legislation and Labor Relations, Princeton U. Alumni
Lectures (1936) 11.
6. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 3. The Board is composed of three
members appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate for five-
year terms. Removal is by the President upon notice and hearing, for neg-
lect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause. The members
are not engaged in any other work but are to devote their full time to
the Board. Section 4(a) provides that the salary of the Board members
is to be $10,000 per year.
Up to September 1, 1936, the Board had handled 1,255 cases involving
282,015 workers. Of these, 832 cases, involving 161,407 workers were
closed; the others were still pending. Of the settled cases, 338, involving
45,769 workers, were closed by agreement of both parties; 139, involving
25,932 workers, were dismissed by the Board or a Regional Director before
any formal action was taken; 280, involving 65,992 workers, were with-
drawn by the petitioners before such action; and 75, involving 23,714 work-
ers, were closed in some other way, including compliance with the Board's
decision. N. R. L. B. Release No. 188, Sept. 10, 1936.
7. In most suits in which the validity of the Act will be challenged
those attacking it will attempt to show that the Act extends to employment
which is not in interstate commerce and does not directly affect such com-
merce. Other vulnerable provisions of the Act are: 1) the provision giv-
ing the Board the power to make restitution of back pay, which it is charged
may violate the jury trial provision of the Constitution; 2) the provision
which it is claimed permits the Board to conduct "fishing expeditions" in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; 3) the provision permitting the Board
to conduct hearings without regard to the established rules of evidence,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss1/12
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for whatever may be the ultimate fate of the Act as applied in
particular cases, it is unquestioned that the federal government
has the power to provide legislation to insure the amicable settle-
ment of labor disputes and to prohibit unfair labor practices in
certain fields where the repercussions of labor difficulty in the
channels of interstate commerce are undoubted." The draftsmen
of the Act have carefully incorporated this constitutional ground
into the Act.9
Since the advent of comprehensive regulatory legislation, be-
ginning about 1880,10 investigatory powers have been conspicu-
ous in federal measures. The power of investigation, even when
exercised with discretion, has been regarded by business interests
as an intolerable burden.1 It is noteworthy that investigatory
which it is contended denies due process; 4) the provision that the Board's
findings of fact shall be conclusive, which it is claimed violates Article III;
and 5) the prohibition of unfair labor practices, which is alleged to violate
the right of employers to bargain freely with their employees.
8. See for example Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Railroad Clerks,
281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427, 74 L. ed. 1034 (1930), where the court upheld
a statute aimed at the avoidance of strikes on interstate railroads, which
required employers to deal with the chosen representatives of their em-
ployees. But cf. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R. Co., 295 U. S.
330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 70 L. ed. 1468 (1935), where a compulsory pension plan
for the employees of interstate railroads was declared unconstitutional. The
jurisdiction of the present National Labor Relations Board does not extend
to railroads, whose activities come under the authority of the Railroad
Labor Board. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 2 (2). The jurisdiction
of the present Board does, however, extend to bus and truck lines.
Recently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the same day held that
the Act was invalid as to a concern doing wholly an intrastate business,
Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 4 U. S. Law Week 133 (C. C. A. 4,
1936) (manufacturing), but valid as to one engaged in interstate commerce.
N. L. R. B. v. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., 4 U. S. Law
Week 134 (C. C. A. 4, 1936) (interstate bus).
9. Section 1: "The denial by employers of the right of employees to or-
ganize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife and unrest,
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety or operation of the instru-
mentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c)
materially affecting, restraining or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce, or
the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminu-
tion of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or
disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of com-
merce." (Italics supplied.)
10. Freund, Administrative- Powers Over Persons and Property (1928)
180.
11. Freund, Ibid.; Mechem, Fishing Expeditions by Commissions (1924)
22 Mich. L. Rev. 765 at p. 776. See Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental
Agencies to Compel Testimony (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 694 at note 104,
where special emphasis is placed upon the hardship to witnesses who live
far from the place of investigation. The writer there points out the possi-
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powers have been bestowed more freely upon administrative
commissions than upon the government departments. 12
The use of the inquisitorial power is greatly affected by the
procedure employed by an administrative agency. In the case
of the National Labor Relations Board, when charges are filed
with a Regional Director," he makes a preliminary investigation
of the facts, which ordinarily includes an interview with the em-
ployer and with those making the charges. The result of this
investigation determines whether a complaint shall be issued in
the name of the Board. If the formal complaint is issued it is
served on the respondent with a notice of hearing in not less
than five days. The hearing is held before a trial examiner, who
has no prior knowledge of the issues. The Board has been given
the power to subpena witnesses14 to the hearings and to require
the production of documents in connection with proceedings
which it institutes.5 As a result of the hearing and a report by
the examiner to it, the Board may make its findings as do other
quasi-judicial tribunals and issue cease-and-desist orders based
biity of interruption of the normal operations of business. The burden of
calling railroad employees as witnesses to places remote from their homes
became so great during the period of federal control that an order was
issued to stop the practice. The validity of the order was upheld in Ala-
bama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Journey, 257 U. S. 111, 42 S. Ct. 6, 66 L. ed. 154
(1921).
12. See Freund, supra, note 8, where it is pointed out that with the ex-
ception of a temporary war-time power the Secretary of Agriculture did
not have such authority until the passage in 1921 of the Packers and Stock-
yards Act (42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 181), which incorporated the
corresponding provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (38 Stat.
717, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 41 et seq.). The Postmaster General has no exam-
ining powers in connection with fraud orders. The Commissioner of Cor-
porations, the predecessor of the Federal Trade Commission, was given
ample power as early as 1903.
13. The Board may not act until charges are filed. National Labor Rela-
tions Act, see. 10 (b).
14. The word subpena in the act is not used in its technical sense. The
subpena of an administrative agency is a mere formal demand for the ap-
pearance of a witness or the production of papers. The tribunal is without
power to penalize disobedience to its demands, but is dependent on the
proper court for enforcement.
15. National Labor Relations Act, see. 11 (1). The want of the subpena
power, except in connection with elections was a major factor hampering
the operations of the old Board (created by Executive Order No. 6763, pur-
suant to Public Resolution No. 44, June 19, 1934). The Board was, also,
dependent upon the Department of Justice to prosecute violators of its or-
ders, as offenders against the National Industrial Recovery Act. In addi-
tion, when suits were brought to enjoin violations at the instance of the
old Board the defendants had thirty days to answer, move to dismiss, pr
apply for a bill of particulars. These procedural delays tended to defeat the
very purpose of the Board, which was to provide prompt handling of par-
ticular controversies. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Educa-
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upon the findings.' The Board may not, however, punish dis-
obedience to its orders, whether to cease and desist or to give or
produce evidence. That power rests in the federal district court
within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or
within the jurisdiction of which the recusant person is found or
transacts business,17 to which the Board must appeal for enforce-
ment. This procedure provides adequate enforcement of the
Board's orders and at the same time avoids a conflict with con-
stitutional guaranties.18 As applied to compelling testimony it
has been accorded judicial sanction. 19 The Board is also given
the power to conduct elections to determine the representatives
for collective bargaining under the "majority rule" provision. 20
Numerous impediments may be placed in the way of the suc-
tion and Labor, 74th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 1958 (March 11-14, 1935)
48 and 60. At. p. 93 it is revealed that the Department of Justice instituted
no prosecutions of violators of the Board's orders.
16. National Labor Relations Act, see. 10 (e).
17. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 11 (2).
18. The power to commit for contempt has been labelled a "judicial"
function so far as federal jurisdiction is concerned. Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 485 (1894). Yet, historically, this
power was not a judicial one. Fox, History of Contempt of Court (1927)
49. It should be remembered that the power is also inherent in American
legislatures. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt
(1926) 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 780. Rarely is the power given to a legislative
committee. Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee
(1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 4 at 24. The problem is discussed generally in Note,
The Power of Administrative Agencies to Commit for Contempt (1935) 35
Col. L. Rev. 578. It is regrettable that the authority of administrative
bodies to punish for contempt has been determined largely by conceptual
applications of the doctrine of the separation of powers. "If the function
of the contempt power is to remove impediments to the administration of
justice, it is a narrow view which would distinguish between the adminis-
trative and judicial departments" 35 Col. L. Rev. at 587. In New York
some local boards are given the powers of Justices of the Peace. The Public
Health Law, sec. 21; N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930) 1783. In some
states by judicial decision the right of an administrative agency to commit
for contempt is established. See Ex parte Battel, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725
(1929) ; Ex parte Sanford, 236 Mo. 665, 139 S. W. 376 (1911) ; In re Hayes,
200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E. 791 (1931). Contra, People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337,
296 Pac. 271 (1931); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N. E. 190
(1892).
19. See testimony of Mr. Biddle on p. 95 of Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, 74th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1958
(March 11-14, 1935). The power to invoke the aid of a court in further-
ance of an investigation by administrative bodies, once challenged as re-
quiring the court to exercise a non-judicial function, is now well established.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125,
38 L. ed. 1047 (1894) ; Railroad Labor Board v. Robertson, 3 F. (2d) 488
(D. C. N. D. Ill., 1924); Cudahy Packing Co. v. U. S., 15 F. (2d) 133 (C. C.
A. 7, 1926).
20. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 9 (a).
19361 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
86 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
cessful administrative use of the investigatory features of the
Act. For example, a contumacious witness may refuse to answer
a question 21 or to produce desired documents and may deny the
Board access to his books and papers. A legal battle may be
instituted either by the party being investigated, seeking to
enjoin the further prosecution of the inquiry, or by the investi-
gating body, making application to the appropriate court to cite
the recalcitrant witness for contempt. 22 The controversy will
then enter upon its long progress through the courts. During
the pendency of the litigation, while motions, rulings, etc., delay
decision, the Board will find it more and more difficult to secure
voluntary compliance with its demands for evidence in other
cases. Until a final court decision is rendered the power of the
tribunal to pursue the investigation will be dubious.
I.
One of the greatest obstacles to the administration of the Act
in its early stages was an influx of suits which greeted the at-
tempt of the Board to conduct hearings and elections, for the
purpose of enjoining further prosecution of the inquiries. In the
majority of these cases the courts have been disinclined to grant
the injunctions.23 Where the application for a restraining order
21. Onerous and oppressive though it be, upon every member of society
rests the duty to testify in the cause of another when called upon. Blair
v. U. S., 250 U. S. 273 (1918); 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sees.
2175, 2192, 2193. Long before the separation of the American colonies from
England, compulsion of witnesses to appear and testify had become estab-
lished in the mother country. See for a list of statutes, Lilienthal, The
Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 694 at note 1. Originally this duty was present only when the cause
was before a judicial tribunal. Freund, "Historical Survey" in Growth of.
American Administrative Law (1923) 17, 18. Now, however, the power of
an administrative body to summon witnesses and to require the production
of books, papers and other documents relating to the matter under investi-
gation is well settled. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154
U. S. 447, 476, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. ed. 1047 (1894).
It does not seem that it can be successfully contended that it is more bur-
densome to testify before an administrative tribunal than to testify in a
regularly constituted court. Lilienthal, supra, at p. 723, note 39; Lange-
luttig, Constitutional Limitations on Administrative Power of Investiga-
tions (1933) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 508, 510.
22. Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations By the Federal
Trade Commission (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 708.
23. Associated Press v. Herrick, 13 F. Supp. 897 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.,
1936), aff'd 85 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 2, 1936); Precision Casting Co. v. Bo-
land, 13 F. Supp. 877 (D. C. W. D. N. Y., 1936), aff'd. 85 F. (2d) 15
(C. C. A. 2, 1936) ; E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d)
12 (C. C. A. 2, 1936); Bradley Lumber Co. of Ark. v. N. L. R. B., 84 F.(2d) 97 (C. C. A. 5, 1936); S. Buschsbaum & Co. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp.
444 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1936); Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. v. Herrick,
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is made when the Board is making its investigation and before
a formal order has been issued, the courts hold that, even if the
Act were wholly unconstitutional, there is insufficient ground
for equitable relief against a mere hearing.24 A valid ground of
equitable jurisdiction must be shown before the enforcement of
an unconstitutional statute will be enjoined. It must appear that
the petitioners are being threatened with irreparable injury
which cannot otherwise be adequately remedied.25 Courts may
not restrain administrative action in the exercise of powers
vested by Congress, merely on the assumption that it might in
the future result in irreparable harm to the petitioners.26 The
inconvenience of an investigation, the interruption of the normal
operations of a business caused by the absence of employees who
are subpenaed as witnesses, the odium of publicity, the exposure
85 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2, 1936); Jamestown Veneer & Plywood Corp. v.
Boland, 15 F. Supp. 28 (D. C. W. D. N. Y., 1936); Ohio Custom Garment
Co. v. Lind, 13 F. Supp. 553 (D. C. S. D. Ohio, 1936); Bemis Bag Co. v.
Feidelson, 13 F. Supp. 153 (D. C. W. D. Tenn., 1936), aff'd. without opin-
ion (C. C. A. 6, 1936); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Nylander, 14 F.
Supp. 201 (D. C. S. D. Cal., 1936); Carlisle Lumber Co. v. Hope, 83 F.
(2d) 92 (C. C. A. 9, 1936); Dartmouth Woolen Mills v. Meyers, 15 F. Supp.
751 (D. C. D. N. H., 1936); Blood & Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp. 779 (D. C.
E. D. Pa., 1936); Remington Rand v. Lind, 4 U. S. Law Week 102 (D. C.
W. D. N. Y., 1936); General Motors Corp. v. Bajork,--F. Supp-(D. C. E.
D. Mo., 1936), rev'd-F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 8, 1936).
In this connection it should be noted that the present Act, unlike the
prior Act (48 Stat. 1183), denies equity review of the Board's decision to
hold hearings or conduct elections.
According to Senator Wagner (Hearings Before the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor, 74th Congress, 1st Session on S. 1958 (March 11-
14, 1935) 50) : "An election is nothing but an investigation, a factual deter-
mination of who are the representatives of employees. There is no more
reason why this should be delayed, than why an investigation by the Board
as to whether there has been an unfair labor practice should be held up."
But when after the election the Board orders an employer to deal with a
designated group, the whole conduct of the election becomes part of the
record which the court may be asked to review, thus enabling the affected
employer to obtain judicial review of the entire matter. To quote from
Senator Wagner's testimony again, ". . . it does not stoop to the folly of
holding the Board up twice, once by court review before the election, and
then by the court review of the order based upon the election."
24. That this rule is well established see Boise Artisian Co. v. Boyd, 213
U. S. 276, 285, 29 S. Ct. 426, 53 L. ed. 796 (1909).
25. See General Motors Corp. v. Bajork,-F. Supp.-(D. C. E. D. Mo.,
1936), citing Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214 (1923); Spielman
Motor Sales Corp. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935); Hegeman Farms v. Bald-
win, 293 U. S. 163 (1934).
26. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929);
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corp. Comm. of Va., 236 U. S. 699
(1915); Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8, 1922); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 228
U. S. 610 (1913).
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of confidential information and the disruption of alleged amicable
relations with employees are not factors giving rise to irrepar-
able injuries. These injuries are largely conjectural and such
as may grow out of ordinary litigation.
If the Board has already issued a formal order based upon
the result of its investigation, there is no reason to grant an in-
junction against its enforcement, since the order is not manda-
tory and obedience can be compelled only by a court.27 Should
the Board apply to a court for an enforcement order, an objec-
tion to the court's jurisdiction on the ground that it was con-
ferred by an unconstitutional enactment will provide a complete
remedy.2 8
One other ground has been relied on in an attempt to show
the need for equitable relief. The petitioners have maintained
that since the Act provides that the findings of the Board as to
the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, 2D a full
judicial hearing before a court, allegedly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, will be denied. The courts generally have not felt that
injunctive relief should be afforded on this ground ;30 for arbi-
trary and capricious findings may be set aside.31 Even if the
provision for the conclusiveness of the Board's fact findings is
held to be invalid, 2 full judicial review may be accorded and the
remainder of the Act be permitted to stand.
27. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 10 (e). There is convincing case
authority for the proposition that a provision in an act for the enforcement
and review of cease-and-desist orders affords an adequate remedy. U. S. v.
Ill. Central Ry., 291 U. S. 457 (1934); White v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367
(1931); Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (D. C. App., 1935), cert.
denied 56 S. Ct. 147 (1936).
28. This basis is especially well considered in the following cases: Asso-
ciated Press v. Herrick; Precision Casting Co. v. Boland; Bradley Lumber
Co. of Ark. v. N. L. R. B.; all supra, note 23.
29. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 10 (e).
30. Precision Casting Co. v. Boland, 13 F. Supp. 877, 884 (D. C. W. D.
N. Y., 1936); Bradley Lumber Co. of Ark. v. N. L. R. B., 84 F. (2d) 97,
100 (C. C. A. 5, 1936); Eagle Picher Lead Co. v. Madden et al., 15 F. Supp.
407 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1936).
31. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162, 166 (1933) ; Federal Radio
Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 276-278.
32. It is possible to adopt the view that the N. L. R. B. undertakes to
determine the duties of private individuals to one another, while other ad-
ministrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, enforce no
private rights but simply prohibit harmful conduct in the public interest.
In the case of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) at p. 50, Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes gave judicial recognition to this distinction when he said,
"As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once apparent between
cases of private right and those which arise between the government and
persons subject to its authority, in connection with the performance of con-
stitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments .... Famil-
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iar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of
such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional
power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the
public lands, the public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and
payments to veterans." In the former type of proceeding, judicial trial de
novo of questions of jurisdictional fact was held to be necessary. If the hold-
ing in Crowell v. Benson applies, the courts will insist upon trial de novo
of jurisdictional facts rather than accept as conclusive the findings of the
Board, or will conclude that the Act does not permit such review and there-
fore is invalid.
One commentator (see Legislation, 35 Col. L. Rev. 1098, 1112 (1935) at
note 100) has suggested that since Crowell v. Benson, which announced the
requirement of judicial redetermination of jurisdictional facts, specifically
exempted findings of administrative bodies performing government func-
tions, such as the removal of burdens from interstate commerce, the Labor
Board will come within the acknowledged exception. The commentator
states that the analogy to the Federal Trade Commission is unavailing but
feels that an analogy may be drawn to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, which is empowered to removed obstructions to interstate commerce
by enforcing the rights of shippers. It is submitted that this analogy will
be rejected by the court. The courts have long placed the railroads in a
judicial pigeonhole of their own, and have afforded them treatment differ-
ing from that given to any other type of industry. Texas & New Orleans
R. R. v. Railroad Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427, 74 L. ed. 1034 (1930) ;
Penn. R. R. v. U. S. Railroad Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72, 43 S. Ct. 278,
67 L. ed. 536 (1923). In Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco
Co., 264 U. S. 298, 305 (1924) it was said, "The mere fact of carrying
on a commerce within state lines and of being organized as a corpora-
tion do not make men's affairs public, as those of a Railroad may be."
In Wolff v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 543 (1922) the statement
is, "The minutely detailed government supervision ... to which railroads
of the country have been gradually subjected by Congress... furnishes no
precedent for regulation of the business of the plaintiff in error whose clas-
sification as public is at best doubtful." See also the language in Smith v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U. S. 33, 43 (1917) ; Wilson v. New,
243 U. S. 332 (1917); St. Louis, etc. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 (1908).
The analogy to the Federal Trade Commission is more persuasive. In
the case of both agencies the complaint is brought in the name of the Board,
which bears the expense of the proceeding. The party who brings the mat-
ter to the agency's attention is not a party to the proceedings and his iden-
tity may never be known. 38 Stat. 721, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 46 (1914) ; 49
Stat. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 160 (1935). The Federal Trade Commission is
not organized to provide a private administrative remedy for private
wrongs. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 50 S. Ct. 1,
74 L. ed. 138 (1930). It would seem that labor practices which have reper-
cussions in the -hannels of interstate commerce are as "public" as the mat-
ters with which the Federal Trade Commission is concerned. Certainly the
effects of labor disputes in large industries, involving large numbers of
workers, cannot be considered as having no public effect. The private aspect
seems merely incidental.
Cases dealing with the Board's activities to date have indicated that judi-
cial review of the jurisdictional facts will be required, but the opinions
are not revealing as to the method employed in such review. Probably the
courts mean review upon trial de novo, since in all instances they cite
Crowell v. Benson. Precision Casting Co. v. Boland, 13 F. Supp. 877, 884
(D. C. W. D. N. Y., 1936); Bradley Lumber Co. of Ark. v. N. L. R. B.,
84 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 5, 1936) at p. 100, "Nor do we think that the
Board's findings of facts on which jurisdiction rests will conclude a court
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In some instances petitioners have been successful in obtain-
ing temporary injunctions preventing the Board or its agents
from conducting investigations. 83 These cases have been decided
on the ground that the activities which were being investigated
were not subject to the federal power and, therefore, that the
Act as applied to them is invalid. It is submitted that the lower
federal courts are exceeding their power in enjoining the en-
forcement of an Act of Congress in the absence of a showing
of irreparable injury.34 To enjoin a hearing or election con-
ducted by the Board acting on a formal complain is to surround
the labor policies and activities of employers with a needless veil
of secrecy.35
Courts granting injunctions have announced that those provi-
sions of the Act which purport to give an adequate remedy at
law are ineffective because of the unconstitutionality of the en-
tire Act, thereby leaving the employer without a remedy at law."
The logical conclusion from such reasoning would seem to place
the right to injunctions upon the general equality power of the
courts, which requires as a condition precedent to the issuance
of an injunction that the probability of irreparable injury be
when reviewing a final order under the procedure fixed by the Act, but
under a proper construction of the Act, jurisdictional findings will be sub-jected to full judicial review."
33. Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 865 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1936), aff'd 85 F.(2d) 172 (C. C. A. 8, 1936) ; Independent Workers of Clayton-Mark & Co.
v. Beman, 13 F. Supp. 627 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1936) ; El Paso Electric Co. v.
Elliott, 15 F. Supp. 81 (D. C. W. D. Tex., 1936); Bendix Products Corp. v.
Beman, 14 F. Supp. 58 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1936); N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clo. Co., 85 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2, 1936; N. L. R. B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. 83 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 5, 1936); Eagle Picher
Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp. 407 (D. C. N. D. Okla., 1936); Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Meyers, 15 F. Supp. 915 (D. C. D. Mass., 1936) ; Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Bajork,-F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 8, 1936); Fruehauf
Trailer Co. v. N. L. R. B., 85 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 6, 1936); Oberman &
Co. Inc. v. Pratt, 4 U:S. Law Week 184 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1936).
34. Allegations of irreparable injury based upon the threat of issuance
of a cease-and-desist order by the Board are prematurely made. Dalton
Adding Machine Co. v. State Corp. Comm., 236 U. S. 699, 701 (1915) ; Con-
tinental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, 369 (1932). At this stage of
the proceeding it cannot be shown with any degree of certainty, if at all,
what the findings and subsequent order of the Board will be. There are no
penalties provided in the Act for failure to obey the Board's order. The only
thing to fear is punishment for contempt of a court order which affirms an
order of the Board. Note, 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 391, 394 (1936).
35. "When the course of justice requires the investigation of the truth,
no man has any knowledge that is rightly private." 4 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed. 1923) sec. 2192.
36. Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 865 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1935), aff'd. 85 F.(2d) 172 (C. C. A. 8, 1936) ; Eagle Picher Lead Co. v. Madden, 15 F. Supp.
407 (D. C. N. D. Okla., 1936).
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established. Some courts apparently have felt that unless they
enjoined the Board the petitioners would be "harassed and an-
noyed."37
II.
The power to compel the production of company records is
explicitly granted by the Act to the Board.3 8 Although the power
has been exercised sparingly, it remains to be considered how
far the Board may pursue its demands should it elect that course.
In demanding the production of books and records the Board
must not traverse the "search and seizure" guaranties39 of the
Fourth Amendment. 40 This amendment was intended to prevent
the tyrannical administration and enforcement of the law41 and
has been construed as embodying those principles of constitu-
tional liberty and security which forbid unwarranted invasions
of private premises by the government and its agents.42
Few constitutional provisions have received such universal
judicial protection against legislative encroachment. 43 In cases
37. Eagle Picher Lead Co. case, supra, note 36 at p. 408.
38. Thus avoiding the problem of whether in the absence of express
power it could come within the general power given to administrative bodies
to make all rules and regulations necessary for the performance of the func-
tions vested in them. See note, Investigatory Powers of. the Securities and
Exchange Commission (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 819, 822, where the commen-
tator discusses the difficulty which arose in this connection under the N. I.
R. A. (15 U. S. C. A. sec. 701), which did not expressly grant the power.
But many of the Industrial Codes promulgated under the N. I. R..A. granted
this power to the Code Authorities. See Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Ry.
Comm. of Texas, 5 F. Supp. 639 (D. C. E. D. Tex., 1934); contra, Ry .n v.
Amazon Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5, 1934).
39. The term "search and seizure" has so long been associated in the
minds of the public with the crudities of prohibition enforcement, that
effects it with a stigma, but its association with an orderly investigation by
an administrative body in connection with the issuance of subpenas and re-
quests for reports is all-important. Its inter-relation with the visitorial
powers of administrative tribunals is evidenced by the many adjudicated
cases. Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade
Commission (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 905, 909.
40. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated . . ."
41. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 612; Fraenkel,
Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 362, 364;
Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Com-
mission (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 905, 910.
42. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. ed. 746 (1886).
43. Sgro v. U. S., 287 U. S. 206 (1933); Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616
(1886) ; Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28 (1927) ; Marron v. U. S., 275 U. S. 192
(1927) ; U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932) ; Safarik v. U. S., 62 F.
(2d) 892 (C. C. A. 8, 1933), reh. denied, 63 F. (2d) 369; Benton v. U. S.,
70 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 4, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 642.
Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 391-392 (1914): "The effect of the Fourth
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of doubt the courts have generally chosen to uphold the consti-
tutional immunities rather than to attempt to find a basis for
circumventing them.44
When, in an endeavor to peruse company records, an adminis-
trative agency is confronted with a protesting party, it makes
use of its subpena power.4 5 In this connection the order must
Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and federal officials,
in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and re-
straints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure
the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects, against all unreason-
able searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches
all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force
and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our federal system with
the enforcement of the laws."
Brain v. U. S., 168 U. S., 532, 544 (1897); ... both (Fourth and Fifth)
of these amendments contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by
means of a constitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty,
which have been secured in the mother country only after years of struggle,
so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their integrity,
free from the possibility of future legislative change."
In re Pacific Railway Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 250 (1887): "... of all
the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves, not merely protection of her person from assault, but exemption
of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny
of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half
their value." Cited with approval in Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894).
44. U. S. v. Di Corvo et al., 37 F. (2d) 125 (D. C. D. Conn., 1927). This
view finds encouragement in an opinion by the Supreme Court in Byars v.
U. S., 273 U. S. 28 (1927): "The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view
of the long misuse of power in the matter of searches and seizures . . and
the assurance against any revival of it, so carefully embodied in the funda-
mental law, is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods,
which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of the con-
stitutional right."
Bradley, J., in Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616 (1886): "Illegitimate and un-
constitional practices get their first footing . . . by silent deviations from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of persons and property
should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy and leads to a gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound that in substance. It is the duty of courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizens and against any
stealthy encroachment thereon."
45. Although a "search" implies a quest by an officer and a "seizure"
brings to mind a forcible dispossession, the Supreme Court has held that a
subpena duces tecum copies within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906) ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251
U. S. 385 (1920). But see 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) see. 2264 for
a criticism. It is to be noted that subpenas have been upheld even where
very broad in their requirements, the court in each case apparently being
satisfied that the documents demanded were material to the matter under
investigation and were reasonably specified. Consolidated Rendering Co. v.
Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1908): "books relating to any dealings or busi-
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not require access to irrelevant or insufficiently specified papers
and records.46
There is no set formula for the determination of the reason-
ableness of a subpena. 47 Each case must be decided with respect
to its own facts and circumstances, guided by the "rudimentary
principles of justice."418 The courts have been fairly consistent
in holding that no inquisitorial board should be permitted of its
own volition to compel one to produce documents, books, and
papers of whatever nature, to the scrutiny of the tribunal, with-
out a judicial check looking to the safeguard of the rights of the
party or company whose records are being demanded. 9 Before
an investigating agency may demand documents, it must show
that such documents are evidentiary, i. e., contains revelant evi-
dence.Y
Investigations based upon complaints "' cannot in themselves
ness between Jan. 1, 1904, and the day of notice"; Wheeler v. U. S., 226
U. S. 478 (1913): "All cash books, ledgers, journals and other books of
accounts"; Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361 (1911): books relating to corpo-
rate matters"; Brown v. U. S., 276 U. S. 134 (1928): "All papers, etc., dur-
ing a specified period relating to manufacture and sale of a special class of
goods."
46. The requirements of relevancy and specificity in judicial subpenas
are often mentioned interchangeably. Note, 45 Yale L. J. 1503, 1506 (1936).
47. Rocchia v. U. S., 78 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 9, 1935); U. S. v. Vatune,
292 Fed. 497 (D. C. Cal., 1923); Parks v. U. S., 76 F. (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 5,
1935), cert. denied 56 S. Ct. Ill (1936); Peru v. U. S., 4 F. (2d) 881
(C. C. A. 8, 1925).
48. Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298,
307, 44 S. Ct. 336, 68 L. ed. 696 (1924). The question of reasonableness is
relegated in reality to the views of the judges who comprise the majority
of the court at any particular time. The rule of reason is an elastic yard-
stick.
49. Cornelius, Searches and Seizures (1926) 44, citing Harriman v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407 (1908) and Foster v. Kenny, 124
N. Y. Supp. 667 (1910).
50. Federal Trade Commission v. Smith, 34 F (2d) 323 (D. C. S. D.
N. Y., 1929); Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., supra,
noto 48.
50a. This is the only kind of an investigation the N. L. R. B. is author-
ized to carry on. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 10 (b). As to whether
statutory investigations conducted by an administrative agency on its own
motion are permissible as applied to businesses affected with a public inter-
est, see Note, 44 Yale L. J. 819, 831 (1935). See discussion at note 74, infra.
Investigations instituted prior to the filing of a complaint or charge of
impropriety or violation giving rise to far reaching subpenas have been de-
nounced as "fishing expeditions" conducted in the hope of securing some-
thing of public interest for publication. Federal Trade Commission v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 305 (1924).
Cudahy Packing Co. v. U. S., 15 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 7, 1926), where
the court held that in advance of any complaint alleging impropriety in the
keeping of the records the Secretary of Agriculture could not examine and
copy all books, records, papers, etc. "Legislative intent to permit unlimited
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be condemned as "fishing expeditions," and a subpena issued in
pursuance thereof could hardly be considered violative of the
constitutional guaranties of the Fourth Amendment,"1 unless
the issuing body is unable to satisfy the court as to the relevancy
of the papers subpenaed.52
III.
The Board has indicated that it does not intend to misuse its
investigatory powers and has shown that it intends to keep with-
in legal bounds, so as not to invite judicial challenge of its pow-
inspection... to learn if there may be cause to believe that a highly penal
statute has been transgressed will not be lightly presumed."
Clair Furnace Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 285 Fed. 936 (D. C.
App., 1923) rev'd. 274 U. S. 160 (1927) on ground that petitioner had a
remedy at law. "Common justice would seem to demand that before business
methods pursued by a corporation or an individual should be investigated,
the party should be apprised either by a formal charge or by notice of the
extent of the proposed investigation in order that a day in court may be
accorded."
51. Federal Trade Commission v. Nulomoline Co., 254 Fed. 988 tC. C. A.
2, 1918) ; Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8, 1922) ; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 32 F. (2d) 966 (D. C. App., 1929).
52. United States et al. v. Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 13 F. Supp.
286 (D. C. W. D. Pa., 1936). The reasonableness of the scope of the sub-
pena may depend upon the nature of the business affected. See Cudahy
Packing Co. v. U. S., 15 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 7, 1926), where it is indicated
that a broader subpena duces tecur would be valid as to stockyard owners
or railroads than as to packers. In Bartlett Frazier Co. et al. v. Hyde, 65
F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 7, 1933), cert. denied 54 S. Ct. 70 (1934), the acts of
the Secretary of Agriculture and the Grain Exchange Supervisor in search-
ing records and books of a Board of Trade member and requiring reports as
authorized by the statute and regulations promulgated, were challenged but
upheld as not violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court said, "The
Amendment, which declares the right of the people to be secure in their
persons and papers against unreasonable search, cannot be applied to regu-
lations which require reports and disclosures in respect to a business which
is affected with a public interest, so far as such disclosures may be reason-
ably necessary for the due protection of the public .... Indeed, where pub-
lic interest requires it, the right of visitation and disclosure has been ex-
tended even to business not charged with a public interest, as witness the
taxing power.. ." citing U. S. v. First National Bank of Mobile, 295 Fed.
142 (D. C. S. D. Ala., 1924), aff'd. 267 U. S. 576 (1925).
The courts are more likely to be liberal toward a Congressional subpena.
When Congress subpenas a witness or documents the courts generally re-
gard only two issues: 1) possible legislative purpose, and 2) rational con-
nection with the subject matter of the inquiry. As regards Congressional
investigations any possible invasion of the "right of privacy" erected by
Supreme Court dicta would seem to be outweighed by the beneficial social
interest in making possible further legislation. See for the most recent
judicial expression, Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 3 U. S. Law
Week 646 (D. C. S. Ct., 1936); commented on and discussed in 36 Col. L.
Rev. 841 and 45 Yale L. J. 1503. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.
135, 161 (1927) ; Landis, Constitutional Limitations upon the Power of In-
vestigations (1926) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 219.
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ers by those to whom its activities are inimical 5 3 So far the
Board has not attempted to conduct "posthumous" investiga-
tions. 54
While it has been advanced that the enforcement of the in-
vestigatory provisions of the Act-5 would be tantamount to a
disregard of the principles laid down in the Fourth Amend-
ment,56 the few cases which have dealt with the problem have
held otherwise. In S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. Beman" the court held
that the authority of the Board to inspect the books of the com-
pany under investigation is not an invasion of constitutional
rights since judicial protection is afforded by the provisions re-
quiring court enforcement. In another case 8 where the Board
applied for an order requiring the respondent to comply with a
subpena, the court granted the application. The subpena called
for the "payroll" of the entire company except for the super-
visory employees. The investigation and contemplated election
53. Rules and Regulations of the N. L. R. B., Art. 2, sec. 21, "Any mem-
ber may issue subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of any evidence, including books, records, correspon-
dence, or documents that relate to any natter under investigation or in
question, before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, conducting the
hearing or investigation. Application for the issuance of such subpenas
may be filled by any party to the proceedings with the Regional Director,
or, during the hearing with the Trial Examiner. Such application shall be
timely and shall specify the name of the witness and the nature of the facts
to be proved by him, and must specify the documents, the production of
which is desired, with such particularity as will enable them to be identified
for the purposes of production." (Italics supplied.)
In N. L. R. B. Release No. 164, August 1, 1936, we find the statement,
"It is not the practice of the Board to give publicity to charges of unfair
labor practices filed against an employer. The Board only makes these
public when its investigation shows sufficient ground for issuing a formal
complaint. For that reason, disputes which reach satisfactory endings 'out
of court' seldom receive public notice."
54. Such investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission
have been condemned. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 56
S. Ct. 654 (1936); commented on in 24 Georgetown L. J. 936; 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 1369; 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1031. At p. 662 of 56 S. Ct. the court said, "An
official inquisition to compel disclosures of fact is not an end, but a means
to an end; and it is a mere truism to say that the end must be a legitimate
one to justify the means. The citizen, when interrogated about his private
affairs, has a right before answering to know why the inquiry is made, and
if the purpose disclosed is not a legitimate one, he may not be compelled
to answer."
55. Section 11 enumerates the extent of the Board's investigatory powers
discussed throughout.
56. Bamberger, Is the National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutional?(1935) 40 Comm. L. J. 570, 571.
57. 15 F. Supp. 444, 450 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1936).
58. N. L. R. B. v. New England Transportation Co., 14 F. Supp. 497
(D. C. D. Conn., 1936).
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related only to the respondent's mechanical department. Yet the
court held that the application was not unreasonably broad,
since certain employees may have overlapping duties and noth-
ing short of a complete list of employees would suffice to enable
the Board to make an accurate classification.
IV.
Another constitutional provision which may be opposed to the
compulsory investigatory power is the Fifth Amendment which
protects an individual from compulsory self-incrimination,"° in
both administrative and judicial proceedings. 0 The privilege
against self-incrimination, which has found sanction in all state
constitutions but two,6' as well as in the Fifth Amendment, oper-
ates as a rule of evidence to prevent the exaction of forced tes-
timony.62
With the rise of governmental regulation of business, the priv-
ilege has been employed to hamper officials in obtaining neces-
sary information to combat outlawed practices63 To overcome
this difficulty, "immunity statutes" have been passed, which com-
pel the giving of desired testimony and grant immunity from
resulting prosecution."
As to the individual, statutory immunity against prosecution
or subjection to a penalty on account of matters concerning which
the person is compelled to testify or produce books and other
documentary evidence, renders the compulsion unobjectionable.
59. "1... nor shall any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ..."
60. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 40, 45 S. Ct. 16, 69 L. ed. 158
(1932).
61. Iowa and New Jersey recognize it as part of their common law.
State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902) ; State v. Zdanowicz, 69
N. J. L. 620, 55 Atl. 743 (1903).
62. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2250; note, 41 Yale L. J.
618 (1932).
63. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 191.
64. The first enactment was in 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 46.
The provision of Section 11 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act is
typical. The immunity statutes are uniformly qualified by the proviso that
the immunity they create shall not extend to punishment for perjury com-
mitted while testifying in compliance with them. The justification for this
exception is found in the rationale that the power to compel the giving of
testimony includes the power to punish the giving of false testimony. The
Supreme Court has put it this way: "The immunity afforded by the consti-
tutional guarantee relates to the past and does not endow the person who
testifies with a license to commit perjury." Glickstein v. U. S., 222 U. S.
139, 141-142 (1911) ; Corwin, supra, note 69, at p. 196, note 99.
65. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2281. The immunity to be
effective must be coextensive with the protection afforded by the Constitu-
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The protection of the Fifth Amendment, however, does not ex-
tend to corporations.6 When it is recognized that in the large
majority of instances the National Labor Relations Board will
be dealing with corporations, this construction may be of great
effect. Apart from policy, there is little to support this con-
struction and it has been suggested that it would be wiser to
grant to corporations the protection of the Fifth Amendment and
then to extend to them the benefits of the immunity clause.6 7
V.
The inquisitorial provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act have been carefully drafted 8 Except in four instances, the
tion (Counselman v. Hitchock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Brown v. Walker, 161
U. S. 591 (1896)) which has been construed to mean full and complete im-
munity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to
answer. U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149 (1931) ; Nelson v. U. S., 201
U. S. 92 (1906). The court has said that the danger of prosecution in
another jurisdiction is too remote to be considered. That the danger is great
and not merely remote is pointed out in a note on the subject, 41 Yale L. J.
618 (1932). The reasoning is analogous to that concerning the admissibility
of evidence obtained through an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Where this evidence is obtained by a government official it is
inadmissible. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914); 30 Mich. L. Rev. 461
(1932). The immunity attaches, however, only when the testimony is given
in obedience to a subpena and not where it is voluntarily given. Sherwin v.
U. S., 268 U. S. 369 (1925), where the petitioner maintained that the prose-
cution should be dismissed because the indictment rested upon information
which the Commission had compelled him to give. The facts showed that
they gave the information to an agent of the Federal Trade Commission who
demanded it but no order was issued in the matter, no subpena served, etc.
The court held the indictment valid.
So far as the states are concerned, West Virginia seems to have gone
the farthest of any state in that it has a statute granting a blanket immu-
nity to cover all administrative investigations. West Virginia Code (1932)
sec. 5742.
66. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. ed. 652 (1906). Not
only may an officer not refuse to produce corporate records in his custody
which tend to incriminate the corporation, but he is not even privileged to
refuse to disclose such' documents as may incriminate himself. Hale v.
Henkel; Nelson v. U. S., 201 U. S. 92 (1906); Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S.
361 (1913); Wheeler v. U. S., 226 U. S. 478 (1913); Drier v. U. S., 221
U. S, 394 (1913); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 211 U. S. 612 (1911).
67. Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property (1928)
193: "If the protection against self-incrimination is based upon considera-
tions of wise policy, the subtlety of distinction between the corporation and
the officer or employee through whom alone the corporation can testify is
to be deprecated, and the reason for making a difference between protection
against self-incrimination (which is denied) and the protection against un-
reasonable search and seizure (which is conceded) is difficult to under-
stand." Accord, Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 855.
68. Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean of the Wisconsin University Law School and
past Chairman of the first National Labor Board testified before the Senate
Committee on March 15, 1935 and said, "I have gone over it (the Act) very
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provisions extend the investigatory power as far as possible with-
out overstepping the bounds fixed by constitutional guarantees
of personal liberty and personal immunity.
In some instances the investigatory powers seem to have been
unduly restricted. For example, the Board is given the author-
ity "to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act."00 But
no investigatory power is given the Board in aid of its rule-
making power.70 This is unfortunate. An intelligent exercise of
this power would seem of necessity to require knowledge of all
matters concerning which rules are to be prescribed.7 1 Nor has
the Board been given the power to require that certain records
be kept,7 2 or to subpena the records of third persons. 3
carefully. I think it is drawn with extreme care and intelligence." Hear-
ings Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., on S. 1958 (March 15-19, 1935) 125; and at p. 131 he is reported as
having said, "I think these words are chosen with great care, and I think
they hit the nail right on the head. I think it is as far as Congress can go."
69. National Labor Relations Act, sec. 6.
70. The investigatory powers of the Board are confined to those powers
given to them in sections 9 and 10 of the Act.
71. Perhaps the reason is that the Supreme Court has denied the right
of administrative agencies to compel private businesses to submit to an ex-
amination of their books and papers in a general fact finding investigation.
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924).
Note that under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 168, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture has been prevented from inspecting the books and rec-
ords of a packer to determine whether the records were properly kept.
Cudahy Packing Co. v. U. S., 15 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 7, 1926). But the
Interstate Commerce Commission has not been .similarly restrained. Smith
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U. S. 33 (1917), which seems to
overrule or at least greatly weaken the holding in Harriman v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407 (1908). The Fourth Amendment is
an effective barrier to such investigations.
There does not seem to be any reason why administrative tribunals should
not be given the power of investigation in connection with their rule-making
power. It would seem that the situation is analogous to that of a Congres-
sional subcommittee. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927) ; Sin-
clair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929); Strawn v. Western Union, 3 U. S. Law
Week 646 (D. C. S. Ct., 1936).
72. There is some doubt whether a provision authorizing the Board to
demand that certain records be kept would be constitutional. State acts
dealing with businesses which they regulate have been upheld. St. Joseph
v. Leven, 128 Mo. 588. 31 S. W. 101 (1895); State c. Davis, 68 W. Va. 142,
69 S. E. 639 (1910); Reaves Warehouses Corp. v. Comm., 141 Va. 194, 126
S. E. 87 (1925).
The Interstate Commerce Commission requires special reports and rec-
ords. Interstate Commerce Commision v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S.
194 (1912) ; B. & 0. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission 211 U. S. 612
(1911). The Federal Reserve Board requires member banks to maintain
certain records. 38 Stat. 261, 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 248 (1913). The Federal
Power Commission may examine the books of its licensees. 41 Stat. 1353,
16 U. S. C. A. sec. 797 (1921). The same power is given the Secretary of
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The greatest deficiency probably lies in that the National
Labor Relations Board, unlike other administrative agencies,74
has not been given the power to conduct investigations for the
sole purpose of obtaining information deemed of value to it in
recommending further legislation to Congress along designated
lines.15
Except for these deficiencies, adequate power seems to have
been given the Board to enable it serviceably to administer
the Act.
WALTER FREEDIAN.
Agriculture under the Grain Futures Act. 42 Stat. 1003, 7 U. S. C. A. sec.
12 (1922). Admittedly all of the above agencies are dealing with businesses
affected with a public interest. Whether the requirement under the N. I.
R. A. was valid was never decided by the Supreme Court. In the most re-
cent legislation (74th Congress, H. R. No. 8442, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13 (b),
June 19, 1936) dealing with price discrimination the burden is placed on
the respondent to rebut the prima facia case made by evidence of price dis-
crimination outlawed by the Act; which means that the party must have his
records to prove his innocence.
73. The Bureau of Internal Revenue has such power. 45 Stat. 878, 26
U. S. C. A. sec. 1514 (1928). The Federal Trade Commission and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission are only given the power to obtain access to
the books and papers of such corporations as are being directly investigated.
41 Stat. 493, 49 U. S. C. A. see. 20 (5) (1920); 38 Stat. 722, 15 U. S. C. A.
sec. 49 (1914).
74. See for example the power given to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Securities Act, 48 Stat. 905, 15 U. S. C. A. see. 78jj; sec. 211
(1934) ; Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 78a; secs.
11 (e), 12 (f), 19 (c), 23 (a) (1934). See also the power given the Inter-
state Commerce Commission in connection with the recommendation of leg-
islation concerning the reorganization of railroads. 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 205
(p) (1935).
The Supreme Court has indicated that a more complete investigatory
power will be permitted agencies conducting investigations based upon com-
plaints charging breaches of the laws which they have a duty to enforce,
than is permitted when the body seeks information upon which to base
recommendations for future legislation. Harriman v. U. S., 211 U. S. 407,
417-418 (1908); Federal Trade Commission v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284
Fed. 886 (D. Md. 1922). See generally, Lilienthal, Power of Governmental
Agencies to Compel Testimony (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 694, 709-719.
75. The investigatory powers of the Board are limited in so far as they
extend only to the functions granted in sections 9 and 10 of the Act.
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